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Following the 2001 anthrax attacks,
infectious disease research laboratories
and personnel were subjected to increased
scrutiny amid concerns that the released
agent originated from within such facili-
ties. Since then, enhanced regulatory
controls have been implemented to thwart
the possibility of future releases. However,
improved microbial forensics technologies
have not been employed to facilitate fault
attribution or to control and track agent
inventories.
We believe that novel systems employ-
ing enhanced identity protection will instill
new public confidence in scientists and
avoid erroneous assignment of liability in
the case of a release. We propose a DNA
watermarking system that includes institu-
tion-, laboratory-, and/or investigator-
specific watermarks in the genomes of
organisms, especially Select Agents. The
system will achieve five key goals critical to
any watermarking system, phrased in
general information theoretic terms: mes-
sage fidelity, error tolerance, ease of
interpretation, availability of signatures,
and resistance to attack (Table 1).
A DNA watermark is a unique synthetic
DNA sequence embedded into the ge-
nome of a genetically tractable organism.
The watermark provides a means for
agent, isolate, or strain identification and
tracking by PCR amplification and se-
quencing of the embedded tag. The power
of watermarking for agent control emerges
when the technology is linked to the
activities of a trusted authorizing entity
(Figure 1). This entity could, for example,
be charged with distributing organisms
containing unique watermark sequences to
individual laboratories and/or investiga-
tors. These watermarks would distinguish
their organisms from those of others in the
research community. Laboratories would
be encouraged, permitted, or required to
use only strains that contain their ap-
proved, and confidential, watermark. In
the event of release, the offending patho-
gen would be interrogated for the presence
of an approved watermark. If such a
watermark were present, then information
about the possible source would become
immediately available. Of course, patho-
gen-specific standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) that ensure the integrity of
the watermarking system (to prevent cross-
contamination, manage the sharing of
strains, and prevent accidental or inten-
tional misuse) would be a necessary
component of any watermarking strategy.
Previously developed watermarking
technologies include approaches for em-
bedding watermarks in microbial genomes
[1–4] and strategies for encryption [2,5,6].
Each method seeks to develop a genetic
cipher that is 1) robust to mutation, 2) easy
for intended users to decipher, and 3)
difficult for third parties to decipher or
alter. While these strategies for manipu-
lating watermarks have been successful at
watermark encoding, placement in a
genome, retrieval from a genome, and
decoding, none of the techniques achieves
all of the five goals (outlined in Table 1)
that are necessary for a watermarking
system for Select Agent tracking.
In our opinion, however, these tech-
niques are worthy of further investigation,
as regards their utility for the research and
biosecurity communities. We propose
investigation proceed on three discrete
but interconnected fronts. First, the theo-
retical mathematical and information as-
pects of watermarking systems must be
examined and rigorously tested in silico.
Second, insertion and removal of water-
marks from microbial genomes must be
assessed, and the phenotypic invisibility of
the watermarks tested. Finally, pathogen-
specific SOPs must be developed, keeping
in mind the need for transparency and
collaboration in research, and tested in a
‘‘role playing’’ scenario. Our initial work
indicates that the model is mathematically
plausible. Previous work in the use of
watermarks suggests that appropriately
placed watermarks can be phenotypically
neutral [1,3]. The technologies to intro-
duce watermarks into several of the
highest risk Select Agent genomes are
currently available, using site-specific in-
sertion tools such as Targetron (intron-
based homing) and Lambda red mutagen-
esis. Adaptation of these or comparable
genetic tools for less tractable Select
Agents would require technological ad-
vances that would also broadly benefit
research of each agent.
Adoption of a watermarking strategy by
research groups would need to be justified
by a cost-benefit analysis, from an institu-
tional liability perspective, and from the
perspective of the research community.
Several salient concerns can be readily
identified. Our proposed system does not
protect against covert usage of naturally
occurring wild-type strains or remediate
existing stocks, but instead provides a
forward-looking strategy. To address cost
concerns, funding agencies that require
enhanced inventory control could be
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Key Goal Feature Description Feature Implementation Feature Benefit Example
Message fidelity Watermark does not disturb
phenotype of organism.
Watermarks integrated into
neutral or selected loci.
No mutual interference
between genomic and
watermark signal.
Telephone conversations
carried on one cable.
Error tolerance Watermark is robust to
insertion, deletion, and
point mutations.
Watermarks designed for redundancy
and encryption. Large pairwise distance
between watermark sequences.
Recover identification in
spite of damage to
information.
JPEG compression
algorithm.
Ease of interpretation
by intended receiver
Watermark can readily be
recovered by authorities.
Watermarks integrated into
defined and stable loci.
Recoverable by
appropriate entities.
Computer password
encryption.
Availability of signatures Each lab receives a unique
signature.
Suitably long watermark sequences.
Large pairwise distance between
watermark sequences.
Nearly unlimited
signatures.
Credit card numbers.
Resistance to
malicious attack
Abundance of watermark
sequences prevents fabrication
of authentic sequences.
Suitably long watermark sequences.
Large pairwise distance between
watermark sequences.
Signature complexity and
length provide security.
Credit card numbers.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000950.t001
Figure 1. Proposed watermark implementation strategies. (A) Schema in which a central authorizing entity distributes watermarked strains to
the research community. The authorizing entity designs and synthesizes confidential DNA watermark sequences. These sequences are introduced
into genetically tractable target organisms using molecular genetic approaches that have proven efficacious in the agent. Proper insertion of
watermarks at the desired loci is confirmed. The growth properties are also validated. The watermarked strains are finally distributed to individual
labs, institutions, or investigators for experimental use. (B) Schema in which a central authorizing entity distributes to the research community DNA
sequences that can be used for watermarking strains. The authorizing entity designs and distributes confidential DNA sequences for watermarking
strains (solid lines). Individual institutions, laboratories, or investigators use this DNA to watermark their experimental strains. The individual research
entities also confirm the proper integration of watermarked DNA sequences into the appropriate target genomic loci, and characterize the
phenotypes of the resultant watermarked strains. The authorizing entity can also serve as a repository for watermarked strains (dotted lines).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000950.g001
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of implementing watermarking systems.
Similarly, these agencies could support or
collaborate with private or public autho-
rizing entities to develop SOPs for strain
management. Finally, convincingly estab-
lishing phenotypic neutrality of genomic
modifications will be non-trivial, and thus,
will constitute an important area for future
research. Despite these potential impedi-
ments, watermarking would nearly elimi-
nate the potential for mistaken assignment
of source for a suspected agent release.
Moreover, the development and imple-
mentation costs may prove to be much less
than other proposed measures for enhanc-
ing laboratory security, including around-
the-clock security patrols.
We considered two variations on the
operational infrastructure required
(Figure 1). An authorizing entity could
(Figure 1A) design, insert, and distribute,
or (Figure 1B) simply distribute, the
secured watermark to requesting labora-
tory. In the latter scenario, the requesting
laboratory would be responsible for adapt-
ing genetic technology to deliver the
watermark. We do not propose that
previously generated modified strains (mu-
tant collections, etc.) would be modified
and restocked. The transition to marked
strains would be incremental but stable.
We speculate that an efficient approach to
this scenario would be to provide funding
opportunities to establish and validate
agent-specific systems. While there are
several potential impediments to imple-
menting the proposed watermarking sys-
tems, the combination of positive impact
on lay perception of responsible scientific
activity and an increased confidence in
control of liability by investigators and
institutions provides a rationale to investi-
gate the development of watermarking
tools for Select Agent research.
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